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 An Experiment in Fair Value Accounting: UK Investment Vehicles 
 
Abstract 
We use the British real estate and investment fund industries as experimental settings where 
historic cost (HC) and fair value accounting (FVA) can be compared. Both industries have the 
majority of their assets marked to market and hence the difference between the two accounting 
systems is profound. However, as the valuation of real estate is arguably more subjective than that of 
investment funds, we are able to contrast fair value accounting in a near ideal setting with one where 
it remains important, but where valuation difficulties may permit bias. As this distinction is 
incorporated in the recently issued SFAS 157, which also formed the basis of the IASB’s relevant 
discussion document, the results of our study may be particularly timely. 
As expected, we find that fair value income is considerably more value relevant than historic 
cost income. However, in the presence of changes in FVA balance sheet values, income measures 
become largely irrelevant. This implies that there is no obvious advantage from adopting FVA income 
accounting if FVA balance sheet values are available to the user. Furthermore, FVA for our real estate 
sample is considerably less value relevant than for the investment companies and the evidence for this 
sample, if not conclusive, is consistent with earnings management. We interpret these results as 
confirming that fair values are highly relevant and largely unbiased where the values are 
unambiguous. Where valuation is ambiguous, which will normally be the case value relevance will be 
lower and biased accounting may be revealed.  
 
Keywords: fair value accounting, valuation models, investment companies. 
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 An Experiment in Fair Value Accounting: UK Investment Vehicles 
 
1. Introduction 
We use the British real estate and investment fund industries as experimental settings where 
we can contrast value relevance and biases in historic cost (HC) and fair value accounting (FVA). UK 
GAAP for these investment vehicles is an unusual hybrid of historic cost and mark-to-market 
accounting for investment assets. In addition to the reported GAAP income and balance sheet figures, 
we are able to estimate both fair value and historic cost accounting figures for the same set of 
companies. With these three different sets of accounting numbers, we test the relationship between 
accounting and stock market variables.  
We distinguish between relevance, bias and reliability. In this paper, as in many others, 
relevance is proxied by the correlation between accounting variables and stock market prices. We 
view bias as earnings management. We test two simple versions of bias: asymmetric recognition, 
which as one dimension of conservatism may be viewed as desirable; and avoiding negative earnings, 
which is normally seen as problematical. The ‘reliability’ of fair values is not seen as a problem for 
investment companies. The valuation is based on prices derived from a competitive and 
comprehensive market incorporating the value estimates of a large number of investors who are 
clearly independent of the investment fund’s management. This would be consistent with SFAS 157’s 
“level 1” valuation (FASB, 2006). However, the reliability of the real estate values is contentious and 
potentially open to both error and manipulation. The values are based on the work of individual 
experts who have to estimate the marketability, or predict the cash flows and discount rates, for assets 
with very different characteristics. The experts are also employed, directly or indirectly, by the real 
estate firms and are, at least potentially, subject to the influence of the real estate firm’s management. 
According to SFAS 157 real estate valuation could be either level 2 or 3 depending on the source of 
the input data1. 
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Thus, we define relevance as explanatory power; bias as a predictable difference in the 
relationship between accounting and market values; and reliability as the precision of fair value 
estimates – for which we rely on the SFAS 157 distinctions. 
Our study is based on two distinctive UK industries. Our data is particularly useful as two 
dimensions which affect the importance and practicality of fair value accounting are a) the scope for 
applying fair values to the assets and liabilities, and b) the reliability with which those fair values can 
be estimated. The investment trust companies in our sample apply fair values to some 93% of their 
assets, and determining the fair values is largely unequivocal as there is limited debate as to the 
appropriate valuation model and little scope for subjectivity. Thus, investment trusts should provide a 
sample that could be thought of as the corner solution where fair value accounting is likely to be 
pervasive and easily computed (FASB, 2006). Conversely, real estate firms, whilst still incorporating 
a substantial proportion of fair value assets (around 75% for our sample) arguably present more 
substantial valuation problems (FASB, 2006). Hence, by contrasting the results of our two samples, 
we can examine the impact of moving away from a corner solution, identified as the investment 
companies, towards what might be thought of as a more general scenario, as represented by real estate 
firms.  
Previous studies have included results for the revaluation of property owned by industrial and 
commercial firms – which would presumably have similar valuation problems to that experienced by 
our real estate firms – and the impact of applying fair values to assets or liabilities of banks – where 
the valuation problems will be comparable with those experienced by our investment trusts. However, 
in neither case is the impact of fair value accounting as pervasive as for our samples, so we expect to 
be able to demonstrate clearer results than in previous papers. We also estimate the impact of FVA on 
the accounting system – income and equity – rather than simply examining the value relevance of a 
particular FVA disclosure, which has been the practice in most previous papers. 
We view our results as being particularly pertinent at this time for two reasons: 
a) The move to international accounting standards (IAS) accounting in 2005 for public firms 
within the EU “will result in many more enterprises developing and reporting fair value measures.” 
(Schipper, 2005). Furthermore, the recently issued SFAS 157, Fair Value Measurement (FASB, 
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2006), can also be expected to encourage more pervasive and standardised fair value accounting, and 
this document formed the basis of the IASB’s discussion document issued in November 2006 as part 
of their Fair Value Measurements project. The IASB noted, in its discussions in December 2005, that 
fair value issues are explicitly required in 17 of their current standards and 8 other standards required 
fair values through reference to other standards. Only 13 of their current standards do not use fair 
value accounting in one way or another (and one of these, IAS 37, is expected to be changed to 
incorporate fair value). 
b) However, some academics have expressed reservations over fair value accounting following 
the perceived misuse of fair value accounting in some recent American accounting scandals (Watts, 
2003) and the role of accounting in boom periods (Penman, 2003). Some practitioners have also 
expressed reservations regarding the reliability of FVA (Ernst & Young, 2005). Conversely, many 
regulators, perhaps surprisingly, are more positive (Schipper, 2005; Whittington, 2005; Barth, 2006).  
It would seem, rightly or wrongly, that fair value accounting is becoming more pervasive and 
its impact, beneficial or adverse, remains contentious. The ICAEW (2006) recently argued that “Given 
the importance of the subject, it has not attracted the interest it deserves” (p. 2). We attempt to 
provide information to help with the ongoing debate. 
We firstly examine the relative value relevance of both historic cost and fair value accounting 
using an adapted version of the conventional levels and changes of earnings model (Easton and 
Harris, 1991). The changed specification we employ allows us to incorporate changes in equity, both 
fair value and historic cost, in the model. This is useful as one option open to accounting regulators is 
to use one approach for income calculation, presumably historic cost, and either use fair values for the 
determination of equity or to make these fair values available via the notes to the accounts. Therefore, 
we also examine the impact of mixed accounting systems – which is reflected, although in different 
ways – in the GAAP accounting currently used by both our sample industries.  
We then investigate bias using modifications of the basic earnings – returns relationship. The 
first approach follows Basu (1997) where we segment the sample between good and bad news cases 
to test for conservative accounting. We then extend this to look in more detail at the frequency of 
negative earnings as measured in the FVA approach. These approaches should not be considered 
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conclusive investigations of accounting bias, but they provide interesting initial evidence. 
Our sample, which only includes firms where estimates are available for all three measures of 
income (GAAP, HC and FVA), consist of 446 real estate and 915 investment company firm-years 
drawn from 1993 to 2002. We find that fair value income accounting is clearly more value relevant 
than historic cost or GAAP for both sets of firms, and that value relevance is much greater for 
investment companies than for real estate firms. This is much as expected. However, where FVA 
balance sheet values are incorporated into our model, income numbers – however calculated – 
become largely irrelevant. This has implications for accounting regulators: if fair value balance sheet 
figures are available FV income numbers may be superfluous (if value relevance is the objective). 
Note that the fair value balance sheet figures need only be available – they don’t have to be 
incorporated into the accounting system – although the relative importance of disclosure and 
measurement is an interesting and, as yet unresolved, empirical question. 
Where the fair values are expected to be reliable, i.e., for investment firms, we find that fair 
value accounting is largely unbiased. It should be noted, though, that any advantage derived from the 
asymmetric recognition of bad news (conservative accounting) is also lost. However, for the real 
estate firms, where fair values may be less reliable, we note that fair value accounting is adopted in 
such a way that negative earnings are unlikely to be frequently disclosed and we observe significantly 
fewer such cases than would be expected. Although we do not attempt to infer the motivation for this, 
we nevertheless interpret this as a warning to regulators. Where fair values are equivocal, the adoption 
of fair value accounting may lead to an increase in accounting bias that should be weighed against any 
gain in relevance.  
As discussed in the literature review below, previous research has often found fair values of 
financial and tangible assets to be value relevant. However, the results are conditional on the 
environment and on the reliability of the estimates provided. There is also some evidence that, for 
both tangible and financial assets, revaluations may be biased. Our results add to this stream of 
research. We have selected two samples where respectively financial and tangible assets are routinely 
and comprehensively revalued. The former sample represents relatively easily valued assets, the 
FASB’s “level 1” and the latter represents more difficult cases which would either fall into the 
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FASB’s level 2 or 3. We investigate the characteristics of the accounting system and not just the 
revaluation of particular assets or liabilities. We apply the same tests to both samples and in doing so 
we can comment on a further crucial issue, as the reliability of financial assets’ valuation is more 
generally accepted than that for tangible assets. Our evidence does seem to support some 
commentators’ reluctance to allow pervasive revaluation of tangible assets. The routine revaluations 
also mean that, for our samples, signalling issues are less significant than otherwise (Citron, 1992; Lin 
and Peasnell, 2000; Dietrich et al., 2001) and we can focus more clearly on issues of relevance and 
reliability. 
Our approach also differs from previous studies in that we estimate fair value and historic cost 
income as well as examining the revaluation amounts. Thus, as well as investigating the relevance of 
the balance sheet amounts, we can contrast the relevance of the two competing income measurement 
systems, fair value and historic cost, and also test these against the pragmatic compromise represented 
in UK GAAP for these industries. Finally, we address aspects of both relevance and reliability. Whilst 
testing relevance is fairly well established, testing reliability is less so. Our two tests are quite simple 
and clearly not comprehensive. However, we are able to show that one sample exhibits results that are 
largely consistent with bias and the other does not.  
In the following sections we review prior research; the accounting for UK investment 
vehicles; the research method; the data used in the analysis; our results; and finally the conclusions. 
 
2. Fair Values and Prior Research 
Barth and Landsman (1995) conclude that where assets are traded in a market that is perfect 
and complete, FVA based balance sheets “reflect all value relevant information, the income statement 
is redundant, [and] income realization is not valuation-relevant…” (p. 97). It might be expected that 
investment companies come close to this characterisation. However, where fair value is not clearly 
defined by an unambiguous market, as for real estate firms, the valuation model and its estimation 
becomes problematic and “neither the balance sheet nor income statement reflects fully all value-
relevant information and income realization potentially can be valuation relevant, although 
management discretion can detract from its relevance” (Barth and Landsman, 1995, p. 97).  
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Value relevance research has been used to address a considerable variety of accounting issues 
(see Easton (1999) for a brief review of some of the crucial issues). In this paper we are concerned 
with fair value and will concentrate on prior papers that address this issue. The strands of research 
most closely related to this paper are those that deal with the fair value of tangible assets, as for our 
real estate firms, and the fair value of financial assets (and liabilities), as for our investment trusts. 
 
Tangible assets 
Early work on current cost adjustments to tangible assets often failed to demonstrate value 
relevance. Barth et al., (2001) suggest that this may be because the estimates provided by 
management were not always reliable. A strand of more recent work has been based on revaluations 
in regimes such as Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand or the UK where revaluation of assets is 
permitted. These studies generally demonstrate value relevance (Standish and Ung, 1982; Brown et 
al., 1992; Whittred and Chan, 1992; Amir et al., 1993; Easton et al., 1993; Easton and Eddey, 1997; 
Barth and Clinch, 1998; Aboody et al., 1999; Herrmann et al., 2002; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh2, 2006). 
However, Amir et al., (1993) suggest that revaluations are less value relevant in the UK than in 
Australia, and Barth and Clinch (1996) argue that revaluations of UK firms’ assets are discounted by 
US investors. Fields et al. (1998) find disclosed fair values by US real estate investment trusts to be 
highly value relevant, although the fair value is perceived to be unreliable and is not fully reflected in 
share prices. Gordon and Vincent (2000) analyse the valuation of property companies in Hong Kong, 
UK and the US during 1994-1997, and find these to be valued similarly, despite the differences in 
disclosure and accounting practices in the three countries. 
Two papers (Aboody et al., 1999; Barth and Clinch, 19983) look at revaluations for samples 
spread over many types of firms in the UK and Australia, respectively. These are conventional firms 
for which revaluations have a marginal impact. They present evidence that the revaluations are 
important both in relation to share prices (and, less robustly, returns) and, in the Aboody et al. (1999) 
paper, with respect to future firm performance. Where their method most closely approaches ours, the 
results for the revaluations are clearly significant in the first paper, but somewhat weaker than ours, 
 8
and variably or marginally significant in the second. Weaker results would be expected for firms 
where revaluations have a marginal impact. 
Dietrich et al. (2001) take a different approach, but their results are very relevant to our paper. 
They also sample UK real estate trusts and have a similar sample size of 355 cases drawn from 1988 
to 1996. (Our sample covers 446 cases from 1993 to 2002). The main thrust of their tests is to 
examine the reliability of the revaluation estimates. Their approach is to look at the role of fair value 
estimates in GAAP accounting – not the possibility of using comprehensive fair value accounting. 
They convincingly demonstrate various biases, although they do find that new regulations (FRS3) 
published in 1993 may have eliminated at least one form of bias.  
 
Financial assets and liabilities 
Fair value studies of financial assets have tended to concentrate on banks’ and insurance 
firms’ financial portfolios and the pension assets available to discharge pension liabilities. These 
studies generally find fair values to be more value relevant than historic cost. Studies of the portfolios 
of banks and insurance firms are largely agreed that fair values dominate historic costs when assessed 
against the value relevance criterion (Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1996; Beaver and Venkatachalam, 
1999; Demers, 1999; Park et al., 1999), and pension assets and liabilities of firms are generally found 
to be relevant to firm valuation (Landsman, 1986; Barth et al., 1992; Amir, 1993, 1996). Of 
potentially more direct relevance to our study of UK investment companies, Carroll et al. (2003) find 
a significant positive relationship between share prices (and returns) and fair value security gains and 
losses for US closed-end mutual funds – even when controlling for historic cost. 
However, fair values – even for financial assets and liabilities – may be subject to uncertainty 
and measurement error, such as where estimates of future pension liabilities (Barth, 1991; Choi et al., 
1997) or the value of illiquid assets held by insurance companies (Petroni and Wahlen, 1995) have to 
be made. Similarly, Eccher et al., (1996) and Nelson (1996) find fair value disclosures of US banks’ 
loans, deposits, long-term debt and net off-balance sheet financial instruments are too noisy to have 
any reliable incremental value relevance. While the reduced value relevance of fair values for such 
illiquid financial instruments may be due to genuine uncertainty regarding fair value, value relevance 
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may also be impeded if the market believes that the ‘fair’ values may be managed or manipulated. In 
their analyses of US banks, Barth (1994) and Warfield and Lindsmeier (1992) find the estimation 
error incorporated in security trading gains and losses (STGLs), especially in the fourth quarter (due 
to incentives to manage tax liabilities or reported earnings), is sufficient to counteract any underlying 
value relevance. Ahmed and Takeda (1995) find that realised gains have less impact if accounting 
returns are low or if the company has low capital ratios – circumstances when incentives to manage 
earnings are high. Similarly, Barth et al., (1996) and Nissim (2003) find the reliability of loan fair 
values to be lower for less healthy banks, as banks may overstate fair values in an attempt to influence 
the market’s perception of their risk and performance. It is interesting to note that Nissim (2003) finds 
that banks manipulate loan fair values (which are more subjective), while asset fair values (which are 
more readily observable to the market) are found to be value relevant. As there is arguably more scope 
for uncertainty surrounding fair values of property than financial securities, we expect fair value 
disclosures by real estate companies to be less value relevant and more biased than fair value 
disclosures by investment companies. We return to this in our empirical analysis. 
 
3. Accounting for UK Investment Vehicles 
Accounting for real estate firms and investment companies in the UK differs from both 
historic cost and full fair value accounting. While the investment assets, which make up the vast 
majority of assets for these companies, are stated in the balance sheet at estimated fair values, the 
income statement does not normally incorporate investment gains or losses, not necessarily even when 
realised.  
The accounting for real estate companies is more conventional, as no special rules apply. 
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 19 “Accounting for investment properties” 
governs the valuation of investment properties and this applies to all firms4. While trading properties 
(which were bought for resale) are carried in the accounts at the lower of cost and net realisable value, 
investment properties are revalued on an annual basis. The unusual feature is that only the change in 
value of investment properties during the year of sale is recognised in income. Any change which had 
occurred, and been transferred to the revaluation reserve in earlier years, is credited directly to the 
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profit and loss reserve. Thus, income only recognises the profits or losses on investment properties 
occurring during the year of disposal.  
The impact of these requirements can be illustrated with a simple example presented in table 
1. Assume a property firm has only one asset: an investment property bought for £100 at the start of 
the year (financed with equity). The firm’s profits from ordinary activities – from rental income less 
operating expenses – amounts to £5 per year. (For simplicity the company pays annual dividends of 
£5 so that the net income has no impact on equity values at the end of the year).  
Assume that at the end of the first year, the fair value of the property has risen to £120, while 
at the end of the second year the company sells the property for £150 in cash. Under historic cost 
(HC), the investment gains will not be recognised until realised in the second year, when the gain of 
£50 is added to income to yield net income of £55. The increase in asset value will similarly not be 
recognised in the balance sheet until realised in year two, with equity now at £150. 
Under full fair value accounting (FVA), increases in asset values will be recognised in the 
balance sheet (£120 at end of year 1 and £150 at the end of year 2), with the unrealised investment 
gain of £20 in year 1, and the additional gain of £30 realised in year 2, taken through the income 
statement. 
Under UK GAAP, revaluations are recognised in the balance sheet through the revaluation 
reserve, and equity values will therefore be the same as under FVA. However, only a small part of the 
investment gains – the difference between the sales proceeds (£150) and the previous revaluation 
(£120) will be taken through the income statement. The previous revaluations now realised (£20) will 
merely be transferred from the revaluation reserve to the revenue reserve. Thus, no investment gains 
will be recognised in the income statement for year 1, while for the second year, £30 will be taken 
through the profit and loss account.  
Table 1 about here 
The accounting for investment companies is, if anything, more unusual than that for real 
estate firms. The GAAP for these firms is governed by the “Statement of Recommended Practice – 
Financial Statements of Investment Trust Companies”, as well as by general legal and professional 
requirements. Since the SORP issued in 1995, investment companies have tended to produce a 
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“Statement of Total Return”, which gives information regarding total return in a columnar format, 
split between revenue and capital5. In the revenue section, which we take to be the main GAAP 
income statement, no investment gains or losses are recognised. The income recognised in the revenue 
section consists mainly of dividends and other direct return on investments. However, in the capital 
section of the statement of total returns, both unrealised and realised investment gains and losses are 
recorded. Adding the revenue and capital sections of the statement of total returns together yields fair 
value income.  Thus, since the statement of recommended practice issued in 1995, UK investment 
companies have reported, quite prominently in their accounts, fair value income.  This is in addition to 
the balance sheet also being at fair value.   
To illustrate the main aspects of their accounts, let us again assume a firm holds a financial 
asset bought at the start of the year for £100, which increases in value to £120 by the end of the first 
year, and is sold at the end of the second year for £150. If we for simplicity again assume net revenue 
income (this time from dividends) of £5 (and that the company makes annual dividend payments of 
£5), the HC and FVA earnings and equity would be the same as for the real estate firm, as reported in 
table 1.  
Under GAAP accounting, the balance sheet incorporates unrealised investment gains and 
losses and is therefore the same as for FVA. However, none of the investment gains – even when 
realised – are recognised in the main revenue section of the income statement. Headline GAAP 
earnings will therefore, in our example, be £5 for both years 1 and 2. The investment gains – both 
realised and unrealised – are, however, recorded in the capital section of the statement of total returns. 
Together, the revenue and capital sections yield the FVA income6. 
Thus, neither real estate firms nor investment trusts use conventional accounting. For both, 
the income reported under GAAP is usually less than it would be under traditional historic cost. Real 
estate firms include rents, profits from properties bought for resale and this years’ realised profit or 
loss on investment properties. Investment companies only incorporate the direct yield on investments 
– dividends and interest payments – and further a proportion of costs are allocated to the capital 
account. Both realised and unrealised returns on investments are accounted for in the capital element 
of the total return statement. In shareholders’ equity, real estate firms maintain a revaluation reserve 
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for unrealised appreciation, and as the appreciations become realised they are transferred to the 
revenue reserve. Investment trust companies include two reserves separate from the revenue reserve – 
realised and unrealised reserves. 
Given our sample firms have a high proportion of financial assets, the differences in earnings 
depending on whether these are measured using GAAP, HC or FVA can be profound. Real estate 
GAAP income averages approximately 6.2% of start of year equity market values, HC earnings 
average 8.4% and FV earnings 16.8%. For investment companies, GAAP earnings tend to be low, at 
2.4% of market value. Again, HC and FV earnings tend to be considerably higher, at 7.9% and 9.1%, 
respectively. 
 
4. Research Methods 
4.1 Tests of Value Relevance 
 Following Bernard (1995), we base our value relevance test on the residual income model, 
which assumes that expectations regarding accounting outcomes follow a clean surplus relationship. 
The residual income model can be expressed as: 
[ 1
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itittitit eqrniEreqpr ]     (1) 
where prit is the price per share at time t, eqit is the book value of equity per share, niit is the net 
income per share, r is the cost of equity capital, and Et[.] the expectations at time t.   
Although Bernard suggests that models based on the residual income model, or models 
incorporating linear dynamics such as Ohlson (1995) or Feltham and Ohlson (1995), are less 
dependent on ad hoc assumptions, it is still necessary to model expectations regarding the appropriate 
discount rate and growth in residual income. Our staring point is an empirical model based on a 
simplified version of the residual income model: 
ititit nieqpr 21 αα +=         (2) 
In this model, expectations regarding the appropriate discount rate and growth in residual income are 
embedded in the coefficients α1 and α2.7
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Following normal practice, and to avoid some of the statistical difficulties involved in 
estimating levels equations, we estimate the relationship in differences scaled by opening share price. 
This leads us to the following specification, where the superscript x refers to a particular accounting 
system: HC, GAAP or FVA:  
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However, as both empirical evidence and theoretical reasoning would suggest that the level and 
change of earnings would contain different information regarding future earnings (Easton and Harris, 
1991), we disaggregate the change in earnings into the levels of current and lagged earnings, to allow 
the regression coefficient to vary between the two components8. Following normal practice, we show 
this as level and change in earnings rather than current and lagged earnings9. 
Finally, we incorporate the change in the revaluation component of equity. This information 
would be available to users of accounting information in both the fair value and GAAP systems and 
could be readily provided to users of historic cost accounts in notes to those accounts. 
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The specification of the model appears somewhat different from conventional value relevance 
tests, such as Easton and Harris (1991), in that the dependent variable is price relative rather than 
returns, and the presence of the equity variables on the right hand side.  In fact, given the high 
correlation between price relatives and returns, the specification of the dependent variable is of little 
practical relevance. We test the sensitivity of our results by using returns as the dependent variable 
and discover very little difference in the results. We also run our regressions using only the level and 
change of earnings as regressors as our base case. Readers may prefer to then think of the equity 
change variables as ‘additional information’ added to the standard earnings level and change value 
relevance model. 
In our initial tests, we look at three income measurement systems (GAAP, HC and FV) with 
a) no equity change variable, b) income together with the historic equity change variable, and c) 
income with the equity change variable plus the revaluation element which adjusts historic cost to fair 
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value. The value relevance tests therefore use nine regressions for both industries.  
 
Hypotheses 
• Fair value accounting will demonstrate higher relative and incremental information content than 
either historic cost or GAAP where the model includes no fair value equity change, or equity 
change measured under the historic cost convention. We expect this dominance to be more 
obvious for investment companies than for real estate firms. We have no presumption regarding 
the relative explanatory power of historic cost or GAAP accounting. The relative explanatory 
power of the three models for any particular specification is tested using the Vuong statistic. 
• We expect income variables to be insignificant in the presence of the change in fair value 
computation of equity for investment companies, and less significant in the presence of change in 
fair value computation of equity for real estate firms (as estimation difficulties may still leave 
income measures significant for this sub-sample). We use the Wald statistic to test the restriction 
that the sum of the two earnings coefficients is significantly different from zero. 
 
4.2 Tests of accounting biases 
 We presume that using fair value accounting should, where fair values are readily and reliably 
available, reduce the opportunities for accounting biases such as asymmetric recognition of good 
versus bad news. Following Basu (1997) and others, we look for asymmetric recognition between 
good and bad news cases: i.e., between those with positive and negative stock price changes. Our 
sample contains 425 firm-years (out of 915, or 46%) with negative price relatives for investment 
companies and 164 (out of 446; 37%) for real estate firms. We use the reverse regression employed 
by Basu (1997) and estimate the coefficients for the following model: 
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 D is a zero-one dummy where D is one if the price relative is negative. The direct test of 
asymmetric recognition is the sign of δ3. A positive and significant δ3 coefficient implies faster 
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recognition of bad news.  
 
Hypothesis 
• Our expectations are that both GAAP and historic cost accounting results will be associated with 
larger and more significant response coefficients during periods of negative returns (bad news). 
However, we expect fair value accounting to display less asymmetric recognition, and that 
recognition will be more symmetric for investment companies than for real estate firms. This is 
because investment companies have reliable and readily available fair value estimates, whereas 
this is more problematic and arguably prone to ‘management’ for real estate firms.  
 
 Focusing only on fair value income, we further extend this examination. As FV earnings 
measures are designed to record changes in value, they should, to a great extent, exhibit similar 
characteristics to changes in market value. (Of course, the other accounting systems do not purport to 
mimic value changes, so we do not test the relationship between value changes and non-FV earnings). 
We first investigate results from the Basu (1997) model to see if the estimated relationship is 
consistent with a system that reports negative earnings when value changes are negative, and secondly 
we examine the frequency of negative earnings to determine if they are indeed under-reported. 
 The first test is conducted by examining whether the estimated coefficients in the Basu 
regression are, for negative price changes, significantly different from unbiased reporting: i.e., an 
intercept (δ0+δ2) of zero and a slope coefficient (δ1+δ3) of one. To provide some intuition for this 
approach we simply point out that if we estimate an intercept of 0.10 and a slope coefficient of 0.50 
we would need a price change below -20% before we would expect negative earnings.  
 To test the second characteristic, we examine whether the observed number of negative 
earnings are significantly less than we would expect given the observed distribution of price changes. 
We conduct this experiment both with total negative earnings and with negative earnings close to 
zero. The rationale follows Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and subsequent studies, which provided 
evidence that suggested that managers are reluctant to report negative earnings. We take this approach 
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as a simple starting point for examining earnings management. However, we should point out that our 
analysis does not employ the distributional assumptions incorporated in Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) and others, but is based on a comparison of earnings and stock price movements in the spirit of 
traditional value relevance tests. We have taken this approach as a) we doubt that our sample is 
sufficient to support a Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) approach and b) as FVA purports to measure 
value changes, unlike other accounting systems, a comparison between negative price changes and 
negative earnings seem appropriate. 
 Commentators have pointed out that we are looking for a deliberate measurement bias in 
unreported accounting numbers (as FV earnings are not reported by the real estate firms, and only 
from 1995 onwards for investment companies). These numbers are unlikely to have any contractual 
function and it is therefore not obvious why managers would wish to manipulate these figures. 
Certainly from a traditional agency perspective the point is well made, and should we fail to find 
evidence of bias, these reservations will provide a convincing explanation. Conversely, should we 
find bias, some justification will be necessary. At this point we will only point out that FVA income is 
largely determined, for these firms, by changes in the FVA valuation of investment assets. Thus, 
negative earnings are usually accompanied by negative changes in the value of assets and any 
reluctance to report negative earnings could equally be a reluctance to report declining investment 
asset values. It does not seem unreasonable to hypothesise that managers of investment firms will, at 
the very least, be concerned about the reputation effect of being seen to manage investments with 
declining values. 
 
Hypothesis. 
• Our expectation is that we will observe unbiased earnings for investment companies with 
intercept and slope coefficients close to zero and one, respectively, and observed distributions of 
negative earnings close to those implied by stock price changes. However, we expect to find a 
reluctance to report negative earnings for real estate firms evidenced by an intercept significantly 
greater than zero, slope coefficients significantly less than one and significantly fewer cases of 
negative earnings than implied by stock price changes. We use the Wald test to examine whether 
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the unbiased zero intercept and unitary slope coefficient is statistically valid and the Chi-squared 
test to contrast the number of cases above and below zero with the number of expected cases.  
 
5. Data 
 From the Company Analysis database (Thomson Financial/Primark), we identify (over the 
period 1993-2002) 989 firm-years for real estate companies, and 3,123 firm-years for investment 
companies, as detailed in table 2. GAAP income and equity (equal to FVA equity) are taken directly 
from the database. Historic cost and fair value income, and historic cost equity are estimated from the 
accounting data. Details of variable definitions and estimation procedures are given in table 3. This 
estimation of the variables follows in the tradition of empirical accounting research where variables 
such as cash flows or accruals, where not directly observable, are estimated from other accounting 
numbers10.  
 Missing data reduce the sample to 754 and 2,226 firm-years for real estate and investment 
companies, respectively. Excluding firm-years substantially different in length from a calendar year 
further reduce the samples to 750 and 2,206 firm-years. Balancing the sample to ensure that all 
variables are present to allow for the calculation of the level and change in GAAP, HC and FV net 
income, as well as the change in reported and historic cost book equity, reduce the sample to 464 
observations for real estate and 999 for investment companies. After trimming to control for outliers 
(we remove the top and bottom 1% of each variable), we are left with a final sample of 446 firm-years 
(for 100 firms) for real estate companies, and 915 firm-years (for 315 firms) for investment 
companies, as detailed in table 2. 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
  Descriptive statistics for the real estate and investment companies are contained in panels A 
and B of table 4, respectively. Both industries experienced growth in equity and market values, and 
average positive earnings, however measured. The performance of the real estate firms was rather 
better than that of the investment trusts. In both industries GAAP earnings were lowest on average, 
with fair value accounting highest and historic cost intermediate. 
Table 4 about here 
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 Correlation statistics between the test variables presented in table 5 with product moment 
statistics below the diagonal and rank correlations above. As with most cross sectional models, we 
find considerable evidence of co-linearity. This is natural and inevitable when we are examining 
different measures of the same underlying construct. High correlations in our data come from two 
sources. First, the different income measures are often closely related. As they purport to be different 
measures of the same variable, this is not surprising. However, they are never included in the same 
models, so this causes no statistical problems. Second, measures of income and changes in equity will 
often be highly correlated as the second is caused by the first. Clearly little can be learned from 
adding equity movements calculated under one method to net income calculated using the same 
method. We report those results for completeness. However, the comparison of interest is the 
combination of fair value equity movements with income measures from other systems. This is a 
viable combination, either in an accounting system that violates the clean surplus relationship, or 
where the fair value numbers are drawn from notes to the accounts.  
Table 5 about here 
 
6. Results 
6.1  Value Relevance Models  
 Results for the test of relative and incremental information content are contained in table 6 for 
the real estate firms, and table 7 for the investment companies. The first set of regressions presented in 
tables 6 and 7 report results for earnings only models using the GAAP, historic cost and fair value 
definitions. The second set of regressions extends the analysis to include the change in historic cost 
equity, whilst the final set of regressions includes the change in revaluation reserves. The results in 
these tables are generated using pooled White-adjusted OLS regressions. We have, however, also 
estimated the models using annual regressions and the Fama-McBeth (1973) approach, as well as 
robust regressions11. The results are generally insensitive to the choice of estimation technique, and 
any differences in the results based on the different estimations are indicated in the tables. 
 As detailed in table 6, for real estate firms the relative information of earnings measured using 
fair value accounting (adjusted R2 of 21.8%) dominates GAAP (7.4%) and historic cost (6.9%)12 and 
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this is confirmed by the conventional Vuong test. If the change in HC equity is added, this 
substantially improves the performance of the GAAP and HC regressions, but leaves both GAAP and 
HC income insignificant. The change in HC equity is significant in all models13, but while the 
explanatory power of the FV model also increases with the inclusion of this variable, FV income 
remains highly significant. Vuong tests still reveal that the FV model dominates the other two, but HC 
and GAAP are indistinguishable. Finally, if the change in revaluations is incorporated14, the 
explanatory power of the various models are statistically indistinguishable, with adjusted R2 values of 
approximately 25%. None of the income measures are significant. Thus, once the balance sheet is 
stated using FVA – as they are under current GAAP – income looses its ability to explain changes in 
share prices for real estate companies, regardless of how earnings are measured.  
Table 6 about here 
 For investment companies, the FV earnings, as detailed in the first set of regressions in table 
7, have much higher adjusted R2 (72.8%) contrasting with 23.2% for HC and 0.3% for GAAP. The 
dominance of FV over both of the other measures and HC over GAAP are statistically confirmed by 
the Vuong test. The introduction of the change in HC equity substantially improves the fit of the 
GAAP model (with adjusted R2 increasing from 0.3% to 18.3%), although it still remains marginally 
in third place. Although HC equity is significant in all models, it has relatively limited effect on the 
overall explanatory power of the other two models15. While the change in HC earnings is found to be 
significant, FV earnings still dominate. As can be seen from the final set of regressions in table 7, the 
inclusion of the change in revaluations extinguishes the explanatory power of GAAP earnings, 
although both HC and FV earnings remain significant, which did not occur with the real estate firms. 
As for real estate firms, the inclusion of revaluation changes in equity leaves all three models with 
very similar explanatory power – the choice of income measure is again largely irrelevant. 
Table 7 about here 
 For both samples, our principal expectations are largely confirmed. Fair value earnings have 
higher value relevance than either GAAP or historic cost. The dominance of fair value is greater for 
investment companies than for real estate firms, and the explanatory power of the fair value models 
are substantially higher for investment companies (adjusted R2 of 74.1%) than for the real estate firms 
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(25.1%). Earnings are largely irrelevant in the presence of changes in revaluation reserves – except for 
FV and HC income for investment firms. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis that, if earnings 
remained value relevant, it would be more likely to occur with the real estate firms. 
 
6.2 Sensitivity analyses 
 The analysis in tables 6 and 7 is based on the price differential as the dependent variable. As 
an alternative specification of equation 1, we run returns regressions. Returns data, which we obtained 
from Datastream, are missing for a number of firms, reducing our sample to 415 firm-years for real 
estate and 714 for investment companies. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the regressions for 
tables 4 and 5 based on this alternative specification of returns. The regression results are similar to 
those reported above and the main conclusions discussed above remain unaltered. 
 We next test the sensitivity of the results reported in tables 6 and 7 above to the inclusion of a 
negative earnings interaction term (Hayn, 1995). The results from these unreported regressions 
indicate that while some of the negative interaction terms are significant (with a negative coefficient, 
as would be expected), there is virtually no change in the explanatory power of the models, and the 
earlier conclusions regarding the relative and incremental explanatory power of the different 
accounting systems remain unaltered.  
 We also examine the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of the level of equity in 
regressions containing income and change in equity. No substantive changes are observed.  
 
6.3 Asymmetric Recognition Results 
 Table 8 contains results for the samples segmented by negative versus positive price relative. 
In the first set of results, the three income only models are presented for the real estate firms and those 
for the investment companies are in the second set. 
 For HC in both industries, and for GAAP for real estate companies, the normal Basu result is 
evident. Bad news has a significantly stronger relationship with price changes than does good news, 
as indicated by the significant δ3 coefficient.16 The model incorporating GAAP earnings for the 
investment companies is insignificant overall and we can draw no conclusions from it. When focusing 
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on the FV results, we find that, for both industries, the incremental bad news coefficient δ3 is not 
significantly different from zero17. This is of course what should be expected from an unbiased 
accounting system, and at first sight we can show no clear evidence of bias.  
 However, the Basu model can be replicated by segmenting the model between good and bad 
news cases instead of using a dummy variable. We also report the adjusted R2, slope coefficient and t-
statistic for these separate good news and bad news regressions. The interesting element lies with the 
FV models. For both industries, the slope coefficients are similar for bad news and good news (0.28 
vs. 0.32 for real estate and 0.95 vs. 0.92 for investment trust), but in both cases the explanatory power 
of the model is considerably higher for good news than for bad news (3.7% vs. 18.9% for real estate 
and 42.9% vs. 65.3% for investment trusts). Our interpretation of this result, although it is only 
indicative, is that the firms are less consistent in writing down assets during bad news periods than 
they are in writing them up during good news periods. Thus, although the Basu test does not reveal 
asymmetric recognition, it does suggest that further investigation of the relationship may be 
instructive. 
Table 8 about here 
 Table 8 also reports the Wald statistics for the test that the combined intercept (δ0+δ2) and the 
combined slope coefficient (δ1+δ3), for cases with negative earnings, are significantly different from 
zero and one, respectively. Tests reveal that for the real estate firms the intercept is significantly above 
zero and the slope significantly less than 1. Fair value income is therefore significantly different from 
what we would expect under unbiased accounting. While the constant is also significantly positive for 
the investment companies, it is less than half the size of that for the real estate firms. Furthermore, the 
bad news slope for investment companies is not significantly different from 1, consistent with 
unbiased accounting. To put these results in context, with a combined intercept of 0.1379 and slope 
coefficient of 0.2762 a real estate firm would expect to report negative earnings when its stock price 
decline by more than 49.9%, whilst for an investment company with intercept 0.0666 and slope 
0.9467, the corresponding value is 7.0%. 
 Table 9 reports tests of expected versus observed negative earnings. We conduct this test for 
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the full sample and for the subset of cases falling within 10 percentage points of zero. Before 
considering the statistical results it is helpful to refer to figures one to four. These plot earnings 
against price changes (both deflated by opening price) for both the full sample and the cases close to 
zero. For the full sample of investment companies (figure 1), we see a tight plot extending well into 
negative earnings, with relatively few cases in the top left or bottom right quadrants (where cases with 
mixed negative and positive results would be found). Conversely, the equivalent real estate plot 
(figure 2) is less tightly grouped, with relatively few negative earnings cases and a significant number 
of cases falling in the lower right quadrant identifying negative price changes and positive earnings. 
Focusing on the area restricted to 20 percentage points either side of zero, for the investment 
companies (figure 3) we can still discern a relationship. Whilst the lower right quadrant (positive 
earnings and negative price changes) is heavily populated, the lower left (negative earnings and 
negative price change) is even more so. Conversely, for the real estate sample (figure 4) there seems 
to be a distinct drop in cases to the left of zero earnings, and the bottom right quadrant (negative price 
changes and positive earnings) has a disproportionately large number of cases.  
Table 9 and figures 1 to 4 about here 
The chi-squared tests show that when we restrict the analysis to cases close to zero, negative 
earnings are significantly underrepresented for real estate firms, but not for investment companies. 
This result is repeated if we alter the band to 5% or 15% on either side of zero, restrict ourselves to 
stock market returns instead of price changes, or replace FVA earnings with changes in FVA equity. 
However, if we look at the full sample rather than that restricted to close to zero, we find that both 
industries are under-represented by negative earnings. The proportion of such under representation is 
much smaller for the investment companies than for the real estate firms18, and the statistical 
significance is lower despite the larger sample size. Even so, it remains the case that for investment 
companies we have almost 20% fewer negative incomes than we would expect given the changes in 
stock price. 
 These results do not prove earnings management among real estate firms, but they are 
consistent with it. Nor do the results explain how or why the earnings are managed. Nevertheless, our 
interpretation of this result is that the clear-cut and unambiguous valuation of investment assets 
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precludes management of investment companies from significant earnings manipulation. Conversely, 
the discretion available to the management of real estate firms in the timing of revaluations and the 
subjectivity involved in valuing real estate assets provides significant opportunities for earnings 
management.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 The accounting for UK financial firms includes financial assets and investment properties in 
the companies’ balance sheets at estimated market values. This gives us an opportunity to investigate 
the relative value relevance of GAAP, historic cost and fair value accounting for UK real estate and 
investment companies. For both industries, most assets are stated in the companies’ accounts at fair 
values (on average, 92% of total assets for investment companies and 75% for real estate firms). 
However, while fair values are generally straightforward and unequivocal for investment companies, 
the valuation of investment properties for real estate firms is less clear-cut and more open to 
manipulation. 
 For both real estate and investment companies, fair value earnings dominate both GAAP and 
historic cost income in explaining annual changes in share prices. However, once the model is 
extended from an earnings-only model to one that controls for the change in the equity at fair value 
accounting (the change in HC equity plus the change in the revaluation reserve), the differences in the 
explanatory powers of the models based on GAAP, historic cost and fair value accounting are 
generally small. This evidence provides no support for the introduction of FVA for income 
statements, as FV equity information can be, and for these industries is already, provided.  
 The explanatory power of the regressions including fair value earnings and changes in fair 
value equity are higher for investment companies (adjusted R2 of 74.1%) than for real estate firms 
(25.1%). The higher information content of fair value estimates for investment companies may be due 
to asset values being more reliably determined for investment company assets than for real estate 
investment, where realisable values are generally more difficult to estimate. Our results are robust to 
varying model specifications and estimation procedures, including controlling for dividends in the 
returns measure, for negative earnings, or for the level (as well as change) in equity. 
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 Our test of conservatism using Basu’s (1997) approach confirms conservative accounting for 
historic cost income and is consistent with unbiased fair value accounting. However, the estimated 
relationship revels that we should only expect negative FV income for investment companies with 
share values declining by more that 7.0% and for real estate firms declining by more that 49.9%. 
Equally, we observe significantly fewer negative FV incomes for both industries and significantly 
fewer small losses for the real estate firms than we would expect given the share price movements. 
We have not examined why or how earnings management is conducted and this evidence should not 
be interpreted as proof of earnings management, even for the real estate firms. However, the evidence 
is consistent with earnings management and strongly so in the case of the real estate firms. For our 
sample of these firms 164 cases (36.8%) revealed declining share prices whilst 47 cases (10.5%) 
reported changing asset values causing FV losses. 
 We interpret our results as confirming that fair value accounting is consistently more value 
relevant than historic cost (or UK GAAP income), although this value relevance can be conveyed via 
asset values and need not be incorporated into income computations. Therefore, our experiment 
provides no convincing support for full FV accounting. Furthermore, the results are consistent with 
the management of fair values to avoid losses and/or declining asset values – especially where fair 
values are ambiguous. The experiment suggests that regulators should be concerned that fair value 
accounting might well be accompanied by earnings (or asset value) management where fair values are 
anything less than unequivocal. 
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Table 1 
Illustrative accounts 
 
  Historic 
Cost 
Fair 
Value 
GAAP 
Real Estate 
GAAP 
Investment Companies 
     Revenue Capital Total 
Year 1       
 Net income 5 25 5 5 20 25 
 Equity 100 120 120   120 
        
Year 2       
 Net income 55 35 35 5 30 35 
 Equity 150 150 150   150 
The table illustrates the key differences between HC, FV and GAAP accounting for UK real 
estate and investment companies. The example assumes the firm’s profits from ordinary activities 
amounts to £5 per year and that the company pays annual dividends of £5 so that the net income 
has no impact on equity values at the end of the year.  We further assume the company owns only 
one asset (be it property or securities), bought with equity for £100 at the start of year 1.  At the 
end of year 1 the value has increased to £120, while at the end of year 2 the company sells the 
asset for £150 in cash. 
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 Table 2.  
Sample 
 
 Real Estate Investment
Initial sample of firms classified as respectively Real Estate 
Companies or Investment Companies by both FT and SIC, 1993-2002 
989 3,123
  
Missing or unsuitable data:  
 Negative share issue  420
 Share price missing 174 69
 Share price at t-1 missing 61 408
  754 2,226
   
Accounting year outwith 350-380 days 4 20
 750 2,206
  
Balanced sample:  
 Eliminate where niHC/pr-1, niFV/pr-1, ∆niHC/pr-1 or ∆niFV/pr-1 
missing. 
286 1,207
  464 999
  
Outlier elimination: 18 84
  446 915
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Table 3 
Variable Definitions 
 
(prit-prit-1)/prit-1 Share Price Relative. 
prit refers to firm i’s price per share for ordinary equity at the accounting year 
end t♣, and prit-1 to the share price at the end of the previous accounting year. 
(Extel Ref = mkt.shpc). 
 
(prit+dvit-prit-1)/prit-1 Share Returns. 
dvit refers to firm i’s ordinary dividends per share for year t defined as ordinary 
dividends. (Extel Ref = ir.dv.os/(mkt.nos)). prit is as previously defined. 
 
niGAAPit/prit-1 GAAP Net Income. 
Firm i’s reported earnings per share for year t defined as earned for ordinary 
after interest charges, extraordinary items, taxation etc. (Extel Ref = (ni + ir.dv 
+ ir.dv.os). All earnings are calculated on a per share basis, dividing by the 
number of shares. (Extel Ref = mkt.nos). The variable is deflated by opening 
share price. 
 
niHCit/prit-1 Historic Cost Net Income. 
niHCit refers to firm i’s historic cost net income. For real estate companies, we 
estimate the historic cost net income by adding realised property gains or losses 
(total revaluations for the year♦ less the increase in unrealised revaluations, as 
reflected by the increase in the revaluation reserve, (Extel Ref = ir.rvl + 
lag(eq.r.rvl) – eq.r.rvl) to niGAAPit. Where relevant, we also adjust for realised 
appreciation on investments, as for investment companies (see below), but 
assume missing values to be zero. For investment companies, we add realised 
investment appreciation to the reported GAAP income, which is estimated from 
the change in the realised capital reserves (Extel Ref = eq.r.rl – lag(eq.r.rl)). 
Where relevant, we also adjust for any realised property gains or losses, as for 
the real estate companies, but assume missing values to be zero. 
 
niFVit/prit-1 Fair Value Net Income. 
niFVit refers to firm i’s fair value net income. For real estate companies, we 
estimate the fair value net income by adding total property revaluations for the 
year (less any tax adjustment or foreign exchange translation gains) to 
niGAAPit. (Extel Ref = ir.rvl + ir.fx + ir.tx). Where relevant, we also adjust for 
any appreciations in investment values, as reflected by changes in the realised 
and unrealised appreciation on investment reserves (Extel Ref = eq.r.rl – 
lag(eq.r.rl) + eq.r.iap – lag(eq.r.iap)), but assume missing values to be zero. For 
investment companies, we add the change in realised and unrealised 
appreciation on investment reserves arising during the year to reported GAAP 
net income. (Extel Ref = eq.r.rl – lag(eq.r.rl) + eq.r.iap – lag(eq.r.iap) + eq.r.rvl 
– lag(eq.r.rvl)). Where data is available, we also adjust for any property 
revaluations for the year, as for the real estate companies, but assume missing 
values to be zero. 
 
∆niGAAPit/prit-1,  
∆niHCit/it-1, and 
∆niFVit/prit-1. 
Change in Net Income.  
These variables measure the change in net income from year t-1 to year t, 
measured using GAAP, historic cost and fair value accounting, respectively. 
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∆eqit/prit-1 Change in Historic Cost Book Equity.  
Change from year t-1 to year t in firm i’s historic cost equity per share. For real 
estate companies, we estimate historic cost book equity by subtracting the 
revaluation reserve (Extel Ref = eq.r.rvl) and, where applicable, any unrealised 
appreciation on investment (Extel Ref = eq.r.iap, but assuming missing values 
to be zero) from the GAAP figure for the book value of ordinary equity (Extel 
Ref = eq – eq.s.ps). For investment companies, we subtract unrealised 
appreciation on investment and, where applicable, the revaluation reserve 
(assuming missing values to be zero) from eq. 
 
∆rvit/prit-1 Change in Revaluations. 
Change from year t-1 to year t in firm i’s revaluations. Revaluations equate to 
the difference between the reported (GAAP, which equates to the FV) and 
historic cost book equity. 
 
♣ Prior evidence (e.g., Barth et al., 1992) indicates that the results are not sensitive to the choice 
between year-end or disclosure date share prices. ♦ Where data for ‘revaluations’ (ir.rvl) is missing, 
we replace this variable with ‘properties gross-revaluation’ (it.pg.rvl). The correlation between these 
two variables is 0.996. 
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Table 4.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Q1 Q3
Panel A – Real Estate (446 firm-years) 
(pr-pr-1)/pr-1  0.0935 0.0760 0.2745 -0.6431 1.7879 -0.0835 0.2298
niGAAP/pr-1 0.0616 0.0622 0.0804 -0.4354 0.5146 0.0373 0.0887
∆niGAAP/pr-1 0.0081 0.0058 0.0856 -0.5684 0.7422 -0.0072 0.0239
niHC/pr-1 0.0840 0.0775 0.1074 -0.6297 0.6076 0.0413 0.1231
∆niHC/pr-1 0.0187 0.0103 0.1103 -0.5684 0.5964 -0.0146 0.0471
niFV/pr-1 0.1680 0.1684 0.1754 -0.5625 0.9282 0.0728 0.2507
∆niFV/pr-1 0.0231 0.0322 0.1810 -0.8278 0.7610 -0.0645 0.1149
∆eq/pr-1 0.0584 0.0479 0.1211 -0.6078 0.8349 0.0149 0.0985
∆rv/pr-1  0.0800 0.0696 0.1493 -0.4332 0.7293 -0.0011 0.1450
    
Panel B – Investment Trusts (915 firm-years) 
(pr-pr-1)/pr-1  0.0273 0.0156 0.3078 -0.7647 1.5854 -0.1434 0.1774
niGAAP/pr-1 0.0237 0.0181 0.0308 -0.0526 0.1746 0.0041 0.0372
∆niGAAP/pr-1 0.0008 0.0009 0.0131 -0.1022 0.0869 -0.0034 0.0044
niHC/pr-1 0.0785 0.0830 0.1619 -0.5531 0.8560 0.0098 0.1392
∆niHC/pr-1 0.0054 0.0036 0.1886 -0.8028 1.0311 -0.0764 0.0714
niFV/pr-1 0.0905 0.0792 0.3370 -0.9089 1.7244 -0.0899 0.2442
∆niFV/pr-1 -0.0054 -0.0471 0.4664 -1.2605 2.6609 -0.2428 0.1780
∆eq/pr-1 0.0597 0.0626 0.1761 -0.7189 0.9103 -0.0054 0.1254
∆rv/pr-1  0.0086 -0.0067 0.2942 -0.8240 1.4568 -0.1563 0.1425
    
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. 
Correlation Matrix 
 (pr-pr-1) 
/pr-1
niGAAP 
/pr-1
∆niGAAP 
/pr-1
niHC 
/pr-1
∆niHC 
/pr-1
niFV 
/pr-1
∆niFV 
/pr-1
∆eq 
/pr-1
∆rv 
/pr-1
Panel A – Real Estate 
(pr-pr-1)/pr-1           0.288 0.164 0.279 0.181 0.431 0.310 0.253 0.343
NiGAAP/pr-1 0.279         0.494 0.772 0.276 0.440 0.313 0.554 0.078
∆niGAAP/pr-1 0.123        0.376  0.355 0.618 0.348 0.491 0.316 0.163
niHC/pr-1 0.267        0.814 0.230  0.481 0.464 0.256 0.673 0.008
∆niHC/pr-1 0.145        0.261 0.754 0.372  0.267 0.427 0.361 0.024
niFV/pr-1 0.471        0.562 0.223 0.530 0.184  0.578 0.399 0.728
∆niFV/pr-1 0.280         0.397 0.444 0.318 0.409 0.614 0.228 0.449
∆eq/pr-1 0.349        0.626 0.094 0.699 0.174 0.463 0.204  -0.097
∆rv/pr-1 0.350        0.102 0.113 -0.025 -0.006 0.759 0.492 -0.034  
          
Panel B - Investment Trusts 
(pr-pr-1)/pr-1           0.089 -0.029 0.454 0.403 0.853 0.640 0.435 0.727
NiGAAP/pr-1 -0.007         0.351 0.211 0.038 0.110 0.035 0.054 0.032
∆niGAAP/pr-1 -0.069        0.362  0.028 0.006 -0.023 -0.000 0.000 -0.033
niHC/pr-1 0.434        0.107 -0.011  0.606 0.491 0.148 0.890 0.082
∆niHC/pr-1 0.439        -0.012 -0.016 0.629  0.447 0.297 0.568 0.199
niFV/pr-1 0.854        0.020 -0.088 0.509 0.513  0.781 0.437 0.853
∆niFV/pr-1 0.665        -0.024 -0.100 0.113 0.404 0.788  0.120 0.836
∆eq/pr-1 0.425         0.033 0.000 0.874 0.543 0.439 0.090 0.063
∆rv/pr-1 0.753        -0.036 -0.095 0.042 0.252 0.877 0.852 0.028  
           
The table contains the correlation coefficients between the variables of analysis. Pearson correlation coefficients are contained in the 
bottom left of the table, while Spearman correlations are reported in the top right.  
 Table 6.  
Earnings Model for Real Estate Companies 
 
 Earnings Only Plus Equity Change Plus Revaluation Change 
      GAAP HC FV GAAP  HC FV GAAP  HC FV
γ0: Const. 
 
0.0359 
(1.94) 
0.0379 
(2.16) 
-0.0322 
(-1.71) 
0.0382 
(2.09) 
0.0450 
(2.54) 
-0.0313 
(-1.66) 
-0.0078 
(-0.43) 
-0.0100 
(-0.57) 
-0.0192 
(-0.98) 
γ1: Ni 
 
0.9275 
(3.59) 
0.6315 
(3.75) 
0.7510 
(6.57) 
0.2159 
(0.67) 
0.0040 
(0.02) 
0.6085 
(5.76) 
0.0101 
(0.03) 
0.0057 
(0.02) 
0.2300 
(1.13) 
γ2: ∆ni 
 
0.0664 
(0.25) 
0.1314 
(0.87) 
-0.0222 
(-0.17) 
0.2263 
(0.84) 
0.2145 
(1.36) 
0.0107 
(0.09) 
0.1542 
(0.59) 
0.2139 
(1.44) 
0.0187 
(0.15) 
γ3: ∆eq 
 
   0.6874 
(3.30) 
0.7556 
(3.09) 
0.3807 
(2.20) 
0.8052 
(4.01) 
0.7827 
(3.22) 
0.6508 
(3.03) 
γ4: ∆rv 
 
       0.6545
(7.19) 
0.6654 
(7.52) 
0.4446 
(2.26) 
Adj R2 7.4%         6.9% 21.8% 12.6% 12.3% 23.9% 24.9% 25.3% 25.1%
F-test 18.85 
(0.000) 
17.59 
(0.000) 
63.17 
(0.000) 
22.46 
(0.000) 
21.89 
(0.000) 
47.49 
(0.000) 
37.39 
(0.000) 
38.78 
(0.000) 
38.24 
(0.000) 
(γ1+γ2 = 0) 15.70 
(0.000) 
23.86 
(0.000) 
43.85 
(0.000) 
2.05 
(0.152) 
0.75 
(0.386) 
50.52 
(0.000) 
0.34 
(0.56) 
0.86 
(0.35) 
1.43 
(0.23) 
 GAAP vs HC GAAP vs FV HC vs FV GAAP vs HC GAAP vs FV HC vs FV GAAP vs HC GAAP vs FV HC vs FV 
Vuong  
F-test -0.32 3.32    3.29 -0.36 3.16 3.15
 
1.12 
 
0.22 
 
-0.25 
White (1980) adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. Coefficients in bold are significant at least at the 10% level (two-tailed test). 
Coefficients that change sign or lose significance under robust or Fama-MacBeth regression estimation are reported in italics. The adjusted R2 and 
Wald statistic for the regressions are reported, as well as Wald statistics for partial restrictions of the regression model. Voung tests for e.g., 
GAAP vs HC test the significance of the difference in the explanatory power of niGAAP and ∆niGAAP against niHC and ∆niHC. 
  
 
Table 7.  
Earnings Model for Investment Companies 
 
 Earnings Only Plus HC Equity Change Plus FV Equity Change 
      GAAP HC FV GAAP  HC FV GAAP  HC FV
γ0: Const. 
 
0.0239 
(1.71) 
-0.0142 
(-1.21) 
-0.0446 
(-8.96) 
-0.0168 
(-1.30) 
-0.0087 
(-0.76) 
-0.0461 
(-9.34) 
-0.0231 
(-3.31) 
-0.0336 
(-5.84) 
-0.0363 
(-7.04) 
γ1: Ni 
 
0.2051 
(0.54) 
0.4979 
(5.15) 
0.7934 
(19.19) 
0.0445 
(0.13) 
0.1587 
(1.08) 
0.7300 
(13.45) 
0.0677 
(0.35) 
0.3977 
(3.60) 
0.4095 
(4.36) 
γ2: ∆ni 
 
-1.7917 
(-1.63) 
0.4472 
(4.76) 
-0.0127 
(-0.43) 
-1.6591 
(-1.73) 
0.4511 
(4.83) 
0.0192 
(0.52) 
-0.0322 
(-0.05) 
0.0027 
(0.04) 
-0.0220 
(-0.58) 
γ3: ∆eq    0.7433 
(10.69) 
0.3537 
(2.88) 
0.1292 
(1.91) 
0.7069 
(15.06) 
0.3865 
(4.33) 
0.3858 
(4.35) 
γ4: ∆rv 
 
       0.7755
(29.35) 
0.7711 
(28.70) 
0.3992 
(3.87) 
Adj R2 0.3%         23.2% 72.8% 18.3% 24.1% 73.1% 72.9% 73.9% 74.1%
F-test 2.35 
(0.096) 
139.33 
(0.000) 
1227.13 
(0.000) 
69.32 
(0.000) 
97.86 
(0.000) 
830.82 
(0.000) 
615.30 
(0.000) 
649.04 
(0.000) 
653.88 
(0.000) 
(γ1+γ2 = 0) 1.98 
(0.159) 
144.37 
(0.000) 
969.73 
(0.000) 
2.66 
(0.103) 
20.55 
(0.000) 
699.66 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.95) 
15.56 
(0.00) 
15.89 
(0.00) 
 GAAP vs HC GAAP vs 
FV 
HC vs FV GAAP vs HC GAAP vs 
FV 
HC vs FV GAAP vs HC GAAP vs FV HC vs FV 
Vuong  
F-test 2.26     4.48 4.06 0.79 3.80 4.03
 
1.32 
 
1.36 
 
0.22 
White (1980) adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. Coefficients in bold are significant at least at the 10% level (two-tailed test). 
Coefficients that change sign or lose significance under robust or Fama-MacBeth regression estimation are reported in italics. The adjusted R2 and 
Wald statistic for the regressions are reported, as well as Wald statistics for partial restrictions of the regression model. Voung tests for e.g., 
GAAP vs HC test the significance of the difference in the explanatory power of niGAAP and ∆niGAAP against niHC and ∆niHC. 
 
  
  
Table 8  
Negative vs Positive Price Relatives 
 
 Real Estate Investment Companies 
     GAAP HC FV GAAP  HC FV
δ0: Const 
 
0.0663 
(10.45) 
0.0955 
(11.63) 
0.1328 
(8.47) 
0.0254 
(14.44) 
0.0938 
(11.14) 
0.0680 
(5.50) 
δ1: Prdiff 
 
0.0403 
(1.79) 
0.0392 
(1.60) 
0.3216 
(5.11) 
-0.0045 
(-0.74) 
0.1442 
(4.25) 
0.9249 
(16.58) 
δ2: D 
 
0.0039 
(0.31) 
-0.0106 
(-0.69) 
0.0067 
(0.26) 
-0.0040 
(-1.27) 
0.0111 
(0.89) 
-0.0014 
(-0.70) 
δ3: D*Prdiff 
 
0.1707 
(2.16) 
0.1922 
(2.15) 
-0.0454 
(-0.31) 
-0.0024 
(-0.17) 
0.2501 
(4.88) 
0.0218 
(0.24) 
Adj R2 9.7%      9.0% 21.7% -0.1% 20.9% 72.8%
F-test 
 
16.92 
(0.000) 
15.59 
(0.000) 
42.18 
(0.000) 
0.60 
(0.613) 
81.66 
(0.000) 
812.82 
(0.000) 
Good News Adj R2 1.2%      0.4% 18.9% 0.0% 5.2% 65.3%
Slope 0.0403 
(1.79) 
0.0392 
(1.60) 
0.3216 
(5.11) 
-0.0045 
(-0.74) 
0.1442 
(4.25) 
0.9249 
(16.58) 
Bad News Adj R2 8.8%      7.5% 3.7% 0.0% 18.9% 42.9%
Slope 
 
0.2111 
(2.79) 
0.2313 
(2.69) 
0.2761 
(2.04) 
-0.0068 
(-0.54) 
0.3944 
(10.26) 
0.9467 
(13.61) 
Bad News Wald Restrictions      
(δ0+δ2) = 0 
 
0.0702 
(6.65) 
0.0849 
(6.51) 
0.1396 
(6.66) 
0.0214 
(8.09) 
0.1048 
(11.43) 
0.0666 
(4.38) 
(δ1+δ3) = 1 
 
-0.7889 
(-10.42) 
-0.7687 
(-8.93) 
-0.7239 
(-5.36) 
-1.0068 
(-79.84) 
-0.6056 
(-15.76) 
-0.0533 
(-0.77) 
Joint Wald 
(p-value) 
970.13 
(0.000) 
748.70 
(0.000 
405.79 
(0.000) 
22753.71 
(0.000) 
124.94 
(0.000) 
75.70 
(0.000) 
 GAAP vs HC GAAP vs FV HC vs FV GAAP vs HC GAAP vs FV HC vs FV 
Vuong  
F-test 
 
5.89 
 
9.97 
 
5.84 
 
14.00 
 
14.46 
 
2.69 
  
Net income (calculated using GAAP, Historic Cost and Fair Value, respectively) is regressed against the price differential [(pr-pr-1)/pr-1], a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 where the price differential is negative [(pr-pr-1)/pr-1<0], and an interactive term. White (1980) adjusted t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. Coefficients are estimated on pooled data for 1993-2002. Coefficients in bold are significant at least at the 10% level (two-tailed 
test). Coefficients that change sign or lose significance under robust or Fama-MacBeth regression are reported in italics. The adjusted R2 and Wald 
statistic for the regression are reported, as well as Wald statistics for partial restrictions of the regression model. The adjusted R2, slope coefficient and 
t-statistic for the good and bad news independent regressions are also reported. Voung tests for e.g., GAAP vs HC test the significance of the 
difference in explanatory power of regressions for GAAP and historic cost net income. 
 
  
 Table 9 
Chi-squared tests of distributions. 
 
 
 
Real Estate Investment Companies 
Full Distribution       
 PR      NI Chi-Sq. PR NI Chi-Sq.
Negative     164 47 84.978 425 341 15.843 
Positive    282 399 (0.000) 490 574 (0.000) 
       
Around Zero       
 PR     NI Chi-Sq. PR NI Chi-Sq.
Negative      74 27 22.60 147 119 0.71
Positive      74 96 (0.000) 151 141 (0.401)
       
The cells report the frequency of cases with positive or negative price relatives (PR) and fair value net 
income (NI). ‘Around zero’ refers to observations with price relatives or fair value net income within 
±10 percentage points. The Chi-squared test (and associated p-values in brackets) examines the 
hypothesis that the frequency distributions of fair value net income and the price relative are the same – 
the p-values reflecting the possibility that the distributions are indeed the same. 
 
 
  
Figure 1 
Investment Companies – Price Relative and Fair Value Net Income 
Full Sample 
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Figure 2 
Real Estate Companies – Price Relative and Fair Value Net Income 
Full Sample 
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Figure 3 
Investment Companies – Price Relative and Fair Value Net Income 
Close to Zero 
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Figure 4 
Real Estate Companies – Price Relative and Fair Value Net Income 
Close to Zero 
 
 
 Notes 
                                                          
1 SFAS 157 identifies a three level fair value hierarchy, with level 1 referring to fair values based on 
input such as quoted prices in active markets for identical assets available at the measurement date. 
Level 2 inputs refers to other inputs that are observable, either directly or indirectly, while Level 3 
inputs are unobservable (FASB, 2006). Earlier drafts of SFAS 157 included five levels and we would 
expect the greater fineness implied to be useful in distinguishing the appropriate position of real estate 
assets held for investment. Under the current statement, real estate assets would probably be 
designated level 2 if the valuation was based on market-corroborated inputs (such as prices per square 
foot of similar buildings), or level 3 if the information was generated within the firm. For our 
purposes the distinction is not crucial. It is obvious that real estate investment assets are dominated by 
financial assets valued by reference to a quoted market. 
2 In New Zealand, companies are allowed to recognise unrealised gains and losses either in the income 
statement or in the balance sheet revaluation reserve. Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2006) find no 
difference in value relevance of the two forms of recognition. 
3 This paper also includes results for financial as well as tangible assets. 
4 Since the adoption of International Accounting Standards by UK listed companies in 2005 (after the 
sample period included in our study), the accounting for investment properties is now governed by 
IAS 40.  IAS permits companies to choose between reporting property values at cost or fair value.  
Gains or losses (in fair values or upon disposal if a cost model is adopted) are to be recognised as 
income or expense in the income statement. 
5 Before the 1995 SORP, most companies did not incorporate a columnar statement of total returns 
including capital returns, although the same information was typically included in the notes to the 
accounts. 
6 While real estate companies normally report a reconciliation of GAAP income to historic cost profits 
and losses, investment companies do not. In reality, the estimation of HC earnings is generally more 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
complex than the example above suggests. For example, it is usual for investment companies to 
simply split the management fees and interest between income and capital by some rule of thumb, 
often 50:50. To get from GAAP earnings to historic cost, any investment management fee or interest 
payable charged to capital needs to be deducted, while any tax that has been allocated to the capital 
rather than revenue element of the account needs to be added back.  
7 In this model, α1 must encapsulate the unit value of opening capital plus the growth and discount rate 
needed to calculate the present value of the capital charge portion of residual income. α2 will capture 
the growth and discount rate of the income element of residual income, including the growth of this 
year’s income to next. 
8 While there are arguments for disaggregating ∆niit into niit and niit-1, we know of no theoretical 
rational or empirical evidence that would suggest that allowing the coefficients on opening and 
closing book value of equity to vary would provide useful information. It could also introduce 
considerable colinearity into the explanatory variables rendering interpretation of the results more 
difficult.  
9 Running regressions with niit and niit-1 is equivalent to incorporating niit and ∆niit.  This 
transformation has no impact on the explanatory power of the model. 
10 We conducted an audit for a sample of firm years. This included a random sample plus an 
investigation of cases where alternative approaches to estimating the variables produced large 
differences. We found no cases where the estimated values of the reserves were misleading, but minor 
differences persist in our estimates of historic cost and fair value earnings. These occur where 
transactions are debited or credited to the relevant reserve accounts that are not relevant to the 
revaluation assets or the recognition of realised earnings. This is not uncommon, but usually trivial. 
However, where share repurchases were conducted by investment trusts, they could write off the 
premium on cancelled shares to the realised capital account. These amounts could be large. We have 
therefore excluded all investment trust cases from our sample where we have evidence of share 
repurchase activity (where ‘share capital issued’, Extel Ref = cfi.s, is negative). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 The method for estimating the robust (rank) regression coefficients is an extension of the Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon procedure. The procedure offers a robust, asymptotically distribution-free 
alternative to the usual least-squares analysis. The regression coefficients are found by minimising a 
measure of the dispersion of the residuals. 
12 Although R2s are unreliable in the presence of heteroscedastcity, and strictly speaking reference 
should be made to the Wald tests of explanatory power, we often refer to the more familiar R2 results 
to aid clarity. However, the models are based on the same data, which implies similar levels of 
heteroscedsaticity, and the R2 results are consistent with the Wald tests. 
13 In the FV model, while the change in HC equity is highly significant under OLS and robust 
estimation, the coefficient loses significance under Fama-MacBeth estimation. This is due to a large 
negative coefficient for 1993 when we have only 15 observations. Excluding this year, ∆eq becomes 
significant also under Fama-MacBeth estimation.  
14 ∆rv is significant under OLS and robust estimation, but not under Fama-MacBeth estimation in the 
FV model. 
15 For the investment companies, the coefficient on ∆ni is (as indicated by italics in table 7) generally 
sensitive to the method of estimation. While the coefficient is significantly negative in the GAAP plus 
HC equity change model under OLS and robust estimation, ∆ni becomes insignificantly positive 
under Fama-Macbeth estimation. 
16 The γ3 coefficients in the GAAP and HC models (as well as the γ1 coefficient in the GAAP model) 
are significant under both OLS and robust regression techniques, although not under Fama-MacBeth 
estimation. The number of observations in some of the annual regressions for real estate firms is fairly 
small, resulting in somewhat erratic regression results.  
17 For the real estate companies, the γ3 coefficient is significantly negative in the FV model under 
robust estimation. This may be indicative of aggressive FV accounting. However, while still negative, 
the γ3 coefficient is not significant under either OLS or Fama-Macbeth estimation. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 There are 425 investment company cases (46.4% of the sample) with negative returns compared to 
341 cases (37.3%) with negative niFV. There are thus almost 19.8% fewer negative niFV cases than 
we would expect from the changes in stock prices. For the real estate companies, the comparable 
figures are 164 cases (36.8%) of negative returns, but only 47 cases (10.5%) of negative niFV – a 
difference of 71.3%. 
  
